









MIB-Edited Volume  
Berlin 2015 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition 
The Young Generation during and after the “Arab Spring” 
Edited by Isabel Schäfer 
 
 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean – Demographic Pressure, 
Human Development and Policies 
 




Schäfer, Isabel, ed. (2015): Youth, Revolt, Recognition – The Young Generation during and after the "Arab Spring". Berlin: 
Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/HU Berlin. 
 
MIB Edited Volume | March 2015 
Project “Mediterranean Institute Berlin”, Humboldt University Berlin; www.mib.hu-berlin.de 
 
HU Online Publikation, Open Access Programm der HU. 
 
To link to this article: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100228139 
www.mib.hu-berlin.de/publikationen 
 
Projekt „Mittelmeer Institut Berlin (MIB)“ 
Project „Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)“ 
 
Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin 
 
Dr. Isabel Schäfer 
Mail: i.schaefer@hu-berlin.de 
 
The MIB publication series is available online at 
https://www.mib.hu-berlin.de/ 
 




















 Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
-  Isabel Schäfer 1 
 
Part I – Theoretical Perspectives 5 
On the Concept of Youth – Some Reflections on Theory 
-  Valeska Henze 5 
 
Part II – Youth and Politics in the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean 17 
Youth as Political Actors after the “Arab Spring”: The Case of 
Tunisia  
-  Carolina Silveira 17 
 
From The Core To The Fringe? The Political Role of Libyan 
Youth During And After The Revolution 
-  Anna Lührmann 27 
 
The Attractiveness of Political Islam for Youth in North Africa 
-  Charlotte Biegler-König 35 
 
The Role of Artistic Protest Movements in the Egyptian 
Revolution 
-  Daniel Farrell 45 
 
The „Gezi Generation“: Youth, Polarization and the „New 
Turkey“ 
-  Gözde Böcü 52 
 
Part III – Youth, Migration and the Socio-Economic Dimension
 62 
Reconfiguration of Tunisian Migration Politics after the  
'Arab Spring' - The Role of Young Civil Society Movements 
-  Inken Bartels 62 
 
Migration and Youth - A Moroccan Perspective 
-  Bachir Hamdouch 80 
 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean: 
Demographic Pressure, Human Development and Policies 








Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
86 
 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean: Demographic Pressure, 
Human Development and Policies 
Wai Mun Hong 
 
Introduction 
(Un)employment can be considered a common measure of socio-economic well-being; it is a term 
that describes economically active persons who find themselves jobless. For many unemployed 
citizens, hopelessness sets in as the period of job search drags on, undoubtedly causing serious 
psychological impact and provoking dissatisfaction with those in power - a dissaisfaction that often 
manifests itself through protests. Unsurprisingly, unemployment became a heated topic during the 
social uprisings that erupted in the Southern Mediterranean region.1  
Unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean during the period preceding the 2010-2011 
social uprisings were in fact improving, but in many countries, rates still remained in the double 
digits. Job creation had been growing faster than the labour force, but the impact was hardly felt. 
Youth bore most of the brunt, becoming more vulnerable to unemployment with respect to other 
working age segments of the population. Job searching was indeed increasingly daunting as an 
average of more than half of the youth in the Southern Mediterranean felt that it was not a good 
time to find a job.2 
Many observers in the region highlight the importance of demographics since the Southern 
Mediterranean youthful population continued to put pressure on the job market capacity with more 
new entrants for every retired person from the labour force. This was changing in the last decade as 
the year-on-year growth of the labour force, including the youth workforce, began to decrease in 
some of the Southern Mediterranean economies. But demographic pressure was not the only aspect 
influencing the Southern Mediterranean's chronic unemployment problem; it was the interaction 
between demographic factors and out-dated equity-oriented socio-economic policies that in fact 
produced a long-term impact on the (youth) (un)employment situation. Southern Mediterranean 
economies focused on public investments in education as part of their post-colonial policies, with the 
objectice of modernising the state by consolidating power and strengthening capacity building and 
legitimacy. It was not until the 1970s that the impact of this on (un)employment started to become 
visible. Public sector contraction only served to exacerbated the situation. Even today, the people of 
the Southern Mediterranean continue to feel the side-effects of these policies as highly educated 
persons find themselves facing increasing difficulties when entering the job market. 
With this context in mind, this paper explores the intricacies of the (un)employment landscape in the 
Southern Mediterranean region. Statistical analysis will be used to observe the impact of 
demographics and human development dynamics on unemployment, illustrating how post-colonial 
policies still play a role in this issue. The analysis includes an intra-regional comparison element due 
of the diversity of the region. The objective is to identify nuanced differences between the 
economies in the Southern Mediterranean region with regard to (un)employment in order to explain 
                                                            
1 The Southern Mediterranean economies refer to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. 
2 Silatech and Gallup, Inc., The Silatech Index, Series: Mindset Score, Year: 2010. Southern Mediterranean economies included in the 
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why some countries experienced social uprisings and socio-political change while others did not. 
Furthermore, this paper also analysis the role that youth played in the social unrests across the 
region, suggesting that young demographics and youth unemployment have been the main factors 
contributing to the social chaos. After all, the youth segment constitutes an important part of the 
social fabric, and is often considered “the future of the country”.  
In the first section, the paper presents an overview of the unemployment situation in the Southern 
Mediterranean with a statistical analysis of the labour and job markets. The second section focuses 
on youth unemployment, and the third on their participation in the labour and job markets. The 
fourth section assesses the impact and the intricacy of demographic trends on (youth) 
unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean based on data from various international 
organisations. The fifth section assesses the human development aspect of the (youth) labour force, 
and explains how this affected (un)employment. Recognising the shortcomings of statistical analysis 
as a method for capturing the intricacies of the unemployment landscape, the sixth section discusses 
some explanations that go beyond recent argumentative narratives. 
Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean 
By 2010, unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean had reached one of its lowest points in 
the decade, with a combined rate of 10 percent3. At the state level, rates varied between 24 percent 
in Palestine and 7 percent in Israel. Regional unemployment also decreased by 5 percent between 
2001 and 20104, although at state level, progress was disparate. Algeria's unemployment situation 
saw the greatest improvement, with its total unemployment rate falling by 17 percentage points, 
while Egypt experienced the slowest improvement, with total unemployment rates falling by only 
0.40 percentage point. (See graph 1.1) 
Graph 1.1. Total unemployment rate, 2001 and 2010, percentage 
                                                            
3       Author's own calculations, The World Bank's Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of total 
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Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Unemployment, total (% of total labor 
force), Year: 2001 and 2010. Note: Data for Lebanon and Libya not available. 
 
However, despite their improving employment situation, Southern Mediterranean economies did not 
succeed in overcoming their chronic unemployment rates. In Algeria, despite a decrease of near 20 
percentage points, the unemployment rate remained at double-digits. In Tunisia, unemployment 
rates not only stayed above 10 percent - the region's second highest -, but also had one of the 
slowest improvements. Similar developments could be found in Jordan, Syria and Egypt. 
Table 1.1. Labour force and job market trends 
 
 Between 2001 and 2010 
 
Total nº. of 
new jobs 
created 
Growth in nº. 
of new jobs 
created, % 





Algeria 3,681,274 53.78 2,280,441 24.22 
Egypt 5,527,938 30.34 5,986,273 29.77 
Israel 686,206 30.06 661,949 26.30 
Jordan 363,704 34.71 368,733 29.63 
Lebanon* 121,626 10.76 148,494 12.10 
Morocco 1,567,295 18.09 1,353,745 13.67 
Syria 977,659 22.30 894,057 18.03 
Tunisia 567,826 20.57 574,193 17.66 
Palestine 224,432 48.49 284,451 46.15 
Southern Mediterranean** 13,596,335 30.44 12,403,840 23.84 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and The World Bank's Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Year: 2001 and 2010.5 Notes: * Between 2004 and 2007. ** Excludes Lebanon and Libya. 
 
What is intriguing about this development is that the region's average of near 5 percent economic 
growth6 per annum (p.a.) in the past decade had little trickle-down affect on job creation. In 2010, 
the Southern Mediterranean labour force was approximately 64 million strong.7 It grew by 24 
percent from 2001, an equivalent of 12.4 million new labour force entrants (see Table 1.1.). The 
region had generally succeeded in stabilising its unemployment rate by stimulating a job creation 
growth of 30 percent, just enough to absorb the number of new labour force entrants. Although the 
number of jobs created was proportionally growing at a rate faster than that of the labour force, it 
did not improve the unemployment situation significantly. 
                                                            
5  (a) Due to incomplete and disparate data for calculation purposes, the difference in the number of employed persons between 2001 
and 2010 as a proxy of the number of new jobs created. The logic being that all employed persons must have a job, and therefore 
difference in the number of employed persons between two-time period is the number of “new” jobs created, positive or negative. 
 (b) Number of new labor force entrants is the difference in the total labor force between 2001 and 2010. 
6 Economic growth here refers to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Growth rate is based on author's own calculations, The World 
Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: GDP growth (annual %), Year: 2001 to 2010. Data for Palestine not  available. 
7 Author's own calculations and The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force), Year: 2001 and 2010. Due to incomparability in the latter comparative analysis, this figure excludes  Lebanon 
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At the state level, Algeria outperformed other economies in the Southern Mediterranean region. Its 
growth in terms of new jobs created exceeded the growth of the labour force by 30 percent, 
explaining the steep drop in unemployment rates. Other Southern Mediterranean economies 
maintained a gap between 1 and 5 percent, but also experienced faster job creation over labour 
force growth. These developments produced mixed effects on unemployment situations across the 
Southern Mediterranean. Algeria benefited the most by far, with approximately 1.4 million of jobs 
created in excess of the number required to cover the number of new labour force entrants as well 
as a substantial portion of the existing pool of unemployed.  
Morocco, Syria and Israel also experienced similar developments, albeit to a lesser extent. In the rest 
of the region, despite similar trends in the growth differential between job creation and the labour 
force, different unemployment dynamics were produced. In Egypt, the number of new jobs created 
was 458,334 short of the number of new labour force entrants. This number was 60,019 in Palestine, 
6,366 in Tunisia, and 5,029 in Jordan.  
On the regional level, the number of new jobs created outstripped the number of new labour force 
entrants by approximately 1.2 million. However, the spill-over of new jobs created in excess only 
marginally decreased overall unemployment rate by 5 percent; unemployment rates thus remained 
at a double-digit 10 percent. Indeed, Southern Mediterranean economies were successful in 
stabilising the unemployment rate in the past decade, but the situation remained unchanged for so 
long that the economies were not only at risk of decreasing productivity and efficiency, but also 
prolonging social discontentment on the ground. Although unemployment rates were somewhat 
stabilised, the real number of unemployed people was still growing. It can be concluded that the 
stablization of unemployment rates is no longer a sustainable strategy in the Southern 
Mediterranean. As the 2010-2011 social uprisings and the continued social discontent in the region 
demonstrate, greater socio-economic progress is needed in order to prevent further social chaos. It is 
not enough to create new jobs as a way to absorb the bulge of new labour force entrants. The 
number of new jobs created must grow at a rate far higher than the stabilising rate in order to bring 
it significantly down, and closer to the potential natural unemployment rate of the economy in order 
to ensure at least the minimum level of productivity and efficiency. 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean 
The unemployment landscape in Southern Mediterranean was bleak for the population at large, but 
the situation was (and still is) even more dauting for the young generation8. On the eve of the social 
uprisings, youth unemployment rates were above 20 percent, which was double the total 
unemployment rate; these rates were, and still are, among the world's highest. Some of the highest 
youth unemployment rates in the region were found in Egypt and Tunisia, where the social uprisings 
ignited. In fact, youth unemployment rates in the region had fallen to around 8 percent since 2001, 
with some economies improving faster than the others. 
Showing the greatest improvement among the Southern Mediterranean economies, Algeria’s youth 
unemployment rate decreased from nearly 50 percent in 2001, the region's highest rate at the time, 
                                                            
8 According to The World Bank, the youth population comprises any person aged between 15 and 24. Youth labour force refers to the 
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to 21.5 percent a decade later. Meanwhile, the youth unemployment rate in Egypt, which in 2001 
stood at 27.7%, fell only by 2.9 percentage points in the same decade, remaining the third highest in 
2010. The situation in Tunisia was also one of the most serious in the region by the eve of its social 
uprising in 2010. (See graph 2.1) 
Graph 2.1. Youth unemployment 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Unemployment, youth total (% of total 
labor force ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010 unless specified otherwise. Note: Data for Libya and Tunisia of 2010 not available. 
 
The high youth unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean region meant that almost 50 
percent of the total number of unemployed persons were youth (2.3 million in 2010). This was most 
visible in Syria and Egypt, where social unrests are still on-going, since more than 50 percent of the 
total unemployed population in these countries were young people. Tunisia was not far behind with 
46 percent. Jordan also had similarly high proportions of unemployed youth, but managed to 
narrowly escape a similar predicament. Better performing economies had a smaller proportion of 
young people within their total unemployment rates (see Table 2.2). 
A common feature of the Southern Mediterranean economies is the decreasing share of youth in 
total unemployment. Syria experinced a decline of 14.16 percentage points, the biggest decline in 
the region. Algeria was a close second, with a decrease of 10 percentage points. In Jordan, however, 
young people remained some of the most vulnerable to unemployment in the region, as the share in 
total unemployment remained extremely high - about 50 percent - and decreased by only 1 percent. 
Palestine was the exception, experiencing an increase in the share of youth in total unemployment. 
The falling share of youth in total unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean economies also 
corresponded to a 24.64% contraction of the pool of unemployed youths. Algeria experienced the 
largest contraction: the number of unemployed youth decreased by 64.02 percent. Still, this was not 
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youth in the total unemployment, Egypt's pool of unemployed youths grew by 11 percent, Lebanon's 
by 8 percent and Jordan's by 2 percent. 
In other words, from a regional perspective, unemployment in Southern Mediterranean had indeed 
made substantial progress in all elements that make up the youth (un)employment composition. 
However, this outcome was underpinned by diverse and unbalanced performances in each economy 
in the MENA region. Although an improving (youth) (un)employment rate is an over-arching indicator 
of better employment prospects, it does not the reveal hidden flaws in the intricate composition of 
elements that result in (un)employment. This is evident in the case of Egypt, where the youth 
unemployment rate and the proportion of youth in total unemployment decreased, but the pool of 
unemployed youth continued to expand. This finding is by no means indicative, but it offers a 
potential explanation to the social chaos and the growing discontent among the unemployed, 
regardless of age. 
However, the same assumption does not explain the case of Syria, for instance. Syria may not have 
been the best performer in the region, but it had a better general scorecard and less contradictions 
than Egypt. In Tunisia, comparable data of the two-time periods do not exist, but the central 
indication factor for the social unrest in 2010-2011 was the high (youth) unemployment rate. 
Table 2.2. Youth unemployment trends and dynamics 
 % of youth within total unemployment rate Between 2001 and 2010 
 2001 2010 Expansion in nº. of unemployed youths 
Growth in nº. 
of unemployed 
youths, % 
Algeria 47.76 37.76 -786,004 -64.02 
Egypt 61.40 55.01 131,387 11.32 
Israel 28.11 24.08 -15,287 -23.24 
Jordan 50.41 ('07) 49.37 1,721 ('07-10) 1.76 ('07-10) 
Lebanon 47.92 ('04) 40.58 ('07) 3,783 (04-07) 8.14 ('04-07) 
Morocco 38.24 37.18 -92,562 -19.55 
Syria 69.94 ('02) 55.79 -137,203 ('02-10) -33.34 ('02-10) 
Tunisia 46.28 ('05) - - - 
Palestine 38.89 40.56 26,910 45.09 
Southern Mediterranean* 49.08 45.34 -735,556 -24.62 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force 
ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010 unless specified, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 
2001 and 2010. Note: * includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Palestine. (a) Year of the data in brackets when data of year 2001 
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Youth labour force and job market trends 
As the youth become increasingly educated and well-informed, they start to represent an important 
part of the Southern Mediterranean socio-economic fabric and contribute to time-invariant socio-
economic development. Yet, this young generation has been the one most affected by 
unemployment. Although the youth segment accounted for only one-fifth of total labour force in the 
Southern Mediterranean countries9 (approximately 13 million in size),, they constituted a 
disproportionate 50 percent of the total number of unemployed persons. The core of the 
unemployment problem troubling many of the Southern Mediterranean economies today could be 
the result of these paradoxical intricacies at work. 
Although many observers argue that demographic pressure has caused the unequal representation 
of youth in total unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean economies, the statistical analysis 
illustrated in Table 3.1. shows that the effect could be marginal. Between 2001 and 2010, youth 
labour force in the Southern Mediterranean region has only grown by 1 percent, or 140,805 persons. 
At the state level, instead of expansion, half of the Southern Mediterranean economies experienced 
a contraction in youth labour force, including Syria and Tunisia where social uprisings erupted. The 
most serious cases were found in Algeria where youth labour force suffered a - 20 percent growth. 
Morocco's youth labour force experienced a -14 percent growth, Tunisia's -11 percent, Syria's -7 
percent, and Lebanon's -2 percent (see Table 3.1.). 
Table 3.1. Labour force trends and dynamics 
 
 Growth between 2001 and 2010 
 Labour force  Youth labour force 
Labour force 
aged 25-64 
Algeria 24.22 -20.01 40.81 
Egypt 29.77 24.34 31.20 
Israel 26.30 3.10 30.15 
Jordan 29.63 20.27 32.54 
Lebanon 43.53 -2.00 56.39 
Libya 25.83 8.85 30.93 
Morocco 13.67 -13.61 22.90 
Syria 18.03 -6.57 28.99 
Tunisia 17.66 -11.03 25.71 
Palestine 46.15 30.13 52.33 
Southern Mediterranean 24.29 1.08 31.48 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Population, 
total, Labor force, total , Labor force participation rate for ages 15-24, total (%), Year: 2001 and 2010,  U.S. Census  Bureau International 
Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
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Most of the Southern Mediterranean economies that experienced negative growth in their youth 
labour force also saw negative growth in the number of unemployed youths (except Lebanon).10 
Egypt's high growth in youth labour force, which was also one of the highest in the region, could 
represent a causal factor in the increase of unemployed youth in the country (likewise for Jordan, 
although to a lesser extent).  
Contractions in youth labour force in the Southern Mediterranean economies could potentially be 
the result of the decreasing youth labour force participation rate. Syria saw the greatest decrease in 
youth labour force participation rates with a decline of 11.70 percentage. Egypt and Libya were the 
only economies to experience an increase in youth labour force participation rates, which increased 
by 5.30 and 1.60 percentage points respectively. In Egypt, however, this rising youth labour force 
participation rate only further accentuated the high proportion of unemployed youth and the (youth) 
unemployment rate. 
Although it remains unclear to what extent youth labour force growth in the Southern 
Mediterranean area affected (youth) unemployment on a regional level, the increase in youth labour 
force certainly provides explanations to some of the cases on a country-level, for example, in Egypt 
or Jordan, where growth in the youth labour force was extremely high. If marginal growth in youth 
labour force cannot provide explanation to the high (youth) unemployment rate in other cases in the 
Southern Mediterranean, (dis)equilibriums in the labour force may hold some justifications.  
Table 3.2. Youth labour force and employment trends 
 
 % of youth in the labour force % of youth in total employed persons 
 2001 2010 2001 2010 
Algeria 27.28 17.56 19.59 15.32 
Egypt 20.83 19.96 16.63 16.50 
Israel 14.21 11.60 12.78 10.72 
Jordan 23.33 ('07) 21.96 19.25 ('07) 18.05 
Lebanon 19.02 ('04) 16.52 ('07) 16.54 ('04) 14.15 ('07) 
Libya 23.10 19.98 - - 
Morocco 25.29 19.22 23.44 17.42 
Syria 31.12 ('02) 24.41 25.97 ('02) 21.53 
Tunisia 19.38 ('05) 16.57 15.40 ('05)  
Palestine 27.83 24.78 24.16 19.87 
Southern Mediterranean* 23.01 18.86 15.23 13.33 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force 
ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
Note: *includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Palestine. (a) The year of the data is specified in brackets when data of year 2001 
and/or 2010 are not available. Labour market in the Southern Mediterranean economies had indeed bean all but balance. Although youth 
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accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total labour force, they also bore the most of the brunt of unemployment, representing 50 
percent of the total unemployed persons. In a labour market in equilibrium, the percentage of youth in the labour market and in the total 
employment would have been similar or close. However, the gap between the proportion of youth in total unemployment and that of total 
labour force in the Southern Mediterranean countries only reveals the unbalances in the labour markets (see Table 3.2.). 
 
In 2010, the gap between the percentage of youth in the labour market and the total employment in 
the Southern Mediterranean countries was 5.53 percent, which was in fact an improvement from 
7.77 percent in 2001. Algeria and Syria experienced the greatest improvements with the gap reduced 
by 5.45 and 2.27 percent respectively, while in the rest of the MENA region, the gap reduced by less 
than 1 percentage. Despite the decreasing gaps, labour markets in Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt 
were still some of the most unbalanced in the MENA region. 
One factor that contributed to the unbalanced youth labour markets in the Southern Mediterranean 
countries was the continued marginalisation faced by young people, even when the job markets 
were expanding. Out of 12 million newly created jobs11, only 8.24 percent were occupied by youth 
(this corresponds to 963,040 jobs). The statistical analysis illustrated in Table 3.3. shows that those 
Southern Mediterranean economies with the greatest improvements in employment rates have 
some of the lowest proportion of new jobs for youth. In Algeria, for instance, despite the greatest 
improvement in the general (un)employment situation, only 7.39 percent of the total new jobs went 
to young people. In Morocco, one of the best performing economies in the MENA region, youth 
labour force was totally excluded from the new job creation efforts, and some young people even 
lost their jobs for the benefit of older labour force; these factors potentially explain the meagre fall 
of youth unemployment in Morocco (see Table 3.3.). 
Table 3.3. Youth in the job market 
 
 Between 2001 and 2010 
% of new jobs 
created occupied by 
youth  
Total nº. of new 
jobs created 
Nº of new jobs 
created occupied 
by youth 
Algeria 3,681,274 271,963 7.39 
Egypt 5,527,938 888,280 16.07 
Israel 686,206 26,371 3.84 
Jordan* 124,010 6,864 5.54 
Lebanon** 121,626 -9,910 -8.15 
Morocco 1,567,295 -248,339 -15.85 
Syria*** 921,541 1,207 0.13 
Palestine 224,432 24,765 11.03 
Southern Mediterranean**** 11,687,146 963,040 8.24 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth 
                                                            
11 Ibid. These 12 million newly created jobs exclude Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. This figure is used instead of 13 million as 
shown in table 1.1., because the respective data on youth unemployment rate are not available, in order to establish a meaningful 




Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
95 
 
total (% of total labor force ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age 
group, Year: 2001 and 2010. Notes: * between 2007-2010. ** between 2004-2007. *** between 2002-2010. **** includes Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Morocco and Palestine only. (a) Data for Libya and Tunisia is not available. (b) The percentage of total new jobs created occupied by 
youths derived from the percentage of the difference between the number of employed youths in 2001 and 2010 over the total new jobs 
created (proxied by the difference in the number of employed persons between the same two-time periods). 
 
means that proportionally, more youth in the labour force benefited from newly created jobs than 
any other economies of the MENA region. This has likely happened at the expense of the existing 
pool of unemployed persons since its youth unemployment rate fell faster than the unemployment 
rate for those aged between 25 and 64. This suggests that a significant proportion of Egyptians 
suffering from socio-economic discontent are aged 25-64, rather than belonging to the youth 
segment per se (between 15 and 24 years old according to the World Bank's definition). In Syria, 
where civil war continues, less than 1 percent of the newly created jobs were occupied by youth 
illustrating the extent to which Syrian youth continue to be marginalised in the job market. 
Is the impact of demographic pressure over-estimated? 
Demographics in the Southern Mediterranean region are indeed young, with the proportion of 
people aged between 0 and 14 representing approximately 30 percent of the population.12 It is likely 
that demographic pressure will continue to stretch the job market’s capacity to absorb the expanding 
labour force. However, this is only one possible explanatory factor; the share of the population aged 
between 0 and 14 is decreasing, which in turn, slows down youth population growth. In the decade 
between 2001 and 2010, youth population in Southern Mediterranean grew by 7.22 percent - vis-á-
vis the total population of 18.81 percent -, while the population aged between 25 and 64 grew by 
25.95 percent13 (see Table 4.1.). 
On the country level, all coutntries except Palestine have a youth population growing slower than the 
working population (aged between 25 and 64), although differences vary between 3 and 27 
percentage. Youth population grew in most of the Southern Mediterranean economies except in 
Tunisia, where a negative growth in youth population became visible, corresponding with the 
contraction of youth labour force in Tunisia. If youth population was growing slowly, this means that 
the demographic pressure would also be correspondingly reduced. Yet, a positive population growth 
rate will always signify an expansion. Rather than focusing on the demographic rates, it is therefore 
relevant to explore the nuances and numeral differences and compare their effects on those 
populations who experienced social uprisings and those who did not. 
Salehi-Isfahani (2012) used the ratio of population aged between 20 and 24 in relation to those aged 
between 60 and 64 to estimate the number of new entrants for every retiring working person, or in 
other words, the entry-to-exit ratio. This means: the higher the ratio, the higher is the pressure on 
the job market’s capacity to absorb the expanding labour force. Using this method, the higgest entry-
to-exit ratio are found in Palestine (6.54), Syria (6.13), and Libya (5.85). Indeed, Syria and Libya have 
experienced social uprisings; however, this method does not explain the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, 
where the entry-to-exit ratio are among the lowest in the MENA region: 3.44 and 3.05 respectively. 
Furthermore, depsite their higher ratios, Algeria (4.22) and Morocco (4.02) hardly experienced any 
social unrests of the magnitude seen in Egypt and Tunisia. 
                                                            
12 Author's own calculations, U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: from 2001 to 2010. 
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Table 4.1. Demographic trends and dynamics 
 
 Growth between 2001 and 2010 






Algeria 15.68 2.76 27.26 
Egypt 20.88 4.96 26.61 
Israel 17.64 9.63 18.29 
Jordan 33.67 27.81 30.55 
Lebanon 8.16 1.33 16.28 
Libya 18.97 4.20 31.82 
Morocco 11.06 1.51 20.66 
Syria 31.47 30.12 34.80 
Tunisia 9.53 -3.75 20.47 
Palestine 28.53 39.94 25.98 
Southern Mediterranean 18.81 7.22 25.95 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by five year age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
 
As long as the (youth) population continues to grow, the Southern Mediterranean economies will 
continue to face demographic pressure on their labour and job markets. However, the impact of 
demographic pressure on (youth) unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean region has been 
over-estimated, since youth population and labour force growth have generally falling. 
Human development in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
Education is often perceived as playing a vital role in human development, and to this effect, people 
in the Southern Mediterranean countries are somewhat fortunate in comparison to global standards, 
as they receive free public education up to tertiary level. This means that Southern Mediterranean 
economies spend more on education in terms of percentages of government expenditure and of the 
GDP than other regions in the developing world with similar income levels (e.g. Southeast Asia). The 
average investment in education in the Southern Mediterranean region (percentage of the 
government expenditure) is in some cases higher than in parts of the European Union (EU), revealing 
the importance attributed to education in this are, and their equity-focussed socio-economic policies 
(see Table 5.1.)  
Morocco made the highest investment on education than any other Southern Mediterranean 
economy by spending 26.21 percent of government expenditure. In second and third place are 
Tunisia and Algeria, who spent 20.68 and 20.27 percent in education respectively. Lebanon's 
investments on education (percentage of government expenditure) was the lowest, but this by no 
means suggests that education is less important here. Rather, this reflects changes that emerged as a 
result of the civil war in the 1970s, which considerably weakened the power and capacity of the state 
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however, does not always produce the desired results; moreover the results of this investment are 
often difficult to measure and quantify. The most common tool for quantifying the impact of the 
expanding investment in education is the increasing school enrolment rate; this happened in the 
Southern Mediterranean economies (Salehi-Isfanhani, 2012: 850). Indeed, the average gross 
enrolment rate for tertiary education was 36.71 percent in the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
which was higher than any developing regions of similar income level, but it lagged behind with 
regard to secondary education.  (see Table 5.2.) However, what we cannot easily quantify is the 
impact of the enlarged and facilitated access to education on economic productivity, especially when 
a significant portion of highly educated persons are unemployed. 
Table 5.1. Public investments in education (average between 2001 and 2010) 
 
 % of government expenditure % of GDP 
Algeria 20.27 4.34 
Egypt 14.04 4.31 
Israel 13.50 6.24 
Lebanon 9.88 2.36 
Morocco 26.21 5.57 
Syria 16.66 5.15 
Tunisia 20.68 6.39 
Southern Mediterranean* 17.32 4.91 
Middle East & North Africa* 17.03 5.12 
Southeast Asia* 16.82 3.27 
East Asia* 15.93 3.95 
Latin America & the Caribbean* 15.58 4.57 
EU 28* 11.74 5.21 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Public spending on education, total (% of 
government expenditure), Public spending on education, total (% of GDP), Year: from 2001 to 2010. Note: * Regional average. (a) Data for 
Jordan, Libya and Palestine not available. (b) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according World Bank's classification, 
which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
economies. (d) East Asia refers to China (no data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. refers to the 41 economies according 
World Bank's classification. 
 
An alternative indication of non-monetary returns on investments in education is the quality of the 
education system. High education investment rates in the Southern Mediterranean countries did not 
automatically result in better educational systems. Here, the Southern Mediterranean countries lag 
behind Southeast Asian education systems, although their performance does remain slightly better 
than education systems in Latin America. In terms of performing quality, Tunisia has the best 
educational system in the Southern Mediterranean region, followed by Jordan and Israel, while those 
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Today, the productivity and efficiency of an economic system is measured by the ubiquitous use of 
advanced technology, closely linked to mathematics and science, and technological development. In 
these terms, Southern Mediterranean economies lag behind, especially in comparison to Asian 
counter-parts (in terms of the quality of mathematics and science education), but perform better 
than their Latin American counter-parts. Within the Southern Mediterranean region, Tunisia and 
Jordan provide the highest quality of mathematics and science education (better than some Asian 
and European countries), while Egypt and Algeria have a lower quality of education in these fields. 
Trends in the International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2011 further revealed deficits in 
the quality of mathematic and science education in the Southern Mediterranean countries.14 On 
average, eighth grade students in the Southern Mediterranean countries scored approximately 10 
percent lower than the global average in mathematics, and 9 percent lower in science (with the 
exception of Israel). Southern Mediterranean economies also had some of the lowest quality scores 
for management schools, performing worse than most of the developing regions of similar income 
level. Yet, this is where some of the Southern Mediterranean economies have achieved higher 
quality compared to other developing regions, and to some European countries. Tunisia stays ahead 
of the rest of the Southern Mediterranean economies in terms of the quality of management 
schools, followed by Morocco, Jordan and Israel. 






















Algeria 83.22 24.02 2.63 3.25 3.28 
Egypt 87.77 34.75 2.58 2.70 3.33 
Israel 91.51 60.41 3.08 3.19 4.10 
Jordan 89.35 39.91 4.45 4.74 4.31 
Libya 93.53 55.75 2.43 3.68 2.23 
Morocco 55.85 11.31 2.86 3.69 4.32 
Tunisia 88.04 30.81 4.89 5.53 5.00 
Southern Mediterranean^ 84.18 36.71 3.28 3.83 3.80 
Middle East & North Africa^ 90.09 30.91 3.80 4.17 4.11 
Southeast Asia^ 76.96 26.81 4.15 4.41 4.28 
East Asia^ 92.39 58.53 4.38 5.18 4.41 
Latin America & the Caribbean^ 84.14 34.64 3.17 3.20 4.16 
EU 28^ 102.38 60.61 4.36 4.80 4.73 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, World Economic Forum's Global Competitive Index, Series: Secondary education enrollment, gross %, 
Tertiary education enrollment, gross %, Quality of the educational system, Quality of math and science education, Quality of management 
schools, Year: 2009-2010. Note: * Score 1-7 (best). ^ Regional average. (a) Data for Lebanon, Syria and Palestine not available. (b) Middle 
East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's classification, which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean 
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economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASE8AN) economies. (d) East Asia refers to China (no 
data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (e) Latin America & the Caribbean refers to the 41 economies according to The 
World Bank's classification. 
These results explain why skills mismatch remains one of the main concerns in the labour and job 
markets. In increasingly inter-dependent economic systems, most Southern Mediterranean 
economies have displayed little compatibility between the supply structure of their economies and 
the world demand, which makes them vulnerable to external competition and more likely to lose 
from economic globalisation than to benefit from it. The quality of the educational systems also 
causes lower productivity, making the region less competitive. The lower quality of educational 
systems can threaten the skills adequacy of the labour force. In the Executive Opinion Survey 
conducted by the World Economic Forum, in the compilation of the Global Competitiveness Index 
2009-2010, an average of 9 percent of the respondents expressed that an inadequate educated 
workforce was one of the five most problematic areas when doing business in the Southern 
Mediterranean region (and more problematic than in economies in Southeast Asia and Latin 
America). This problem is evident in Syria, where 13.40 percent of the respondents indicated that 
skill inadequacy as one of the five most problematic areas, followed by Jordan (12 percent), and 
Egypt (10 percent). The rest of the Southern Mediterranean economies have lower positions than the 
average of other developing regions, with the exception of Israel and Libya, where skill inadequacy is 
less problematic. 











welfare Education Agriculture Services 
Algeria 12.15 13.00 21.00 43.25 4.25 1.50 2.00 1.75 
Israel 5.590 31.50 9.50 31.50 4.50 15.00 - - 
Jordan 14.50 9.00 14.50 28.25 9.25 16.25 2.50 - 
Lebanon 10.25 12.25 14.33 45.08 11.42 4.25 0.33 1.83 
Morocco 16.33 9.50 16.75 38.25 5.75 8.00 1.00 2.25 
Tunisia 26.00 16.00 19.00 24.00 9.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Palestine 11.09 7.18 13.55 32.36 8.55 25.73 0.36 0.55 
Southern Mediterranean^ 13.07 14.06 15.52 34.67 7.53 10.25 1.37 2.08 
Middle East, North Africa^ 12.08 14.19 15.91 33.23 7.61 11.73 1.65 2.36 
Southeast Asia^ 11.97 12.56 12.53 30.26 6.09 20.55 4.26 2.30 
East Asia^ 8.68 22.54 14.51 26.27 8.86 8.86 1.18 5.12 
Latin America, the 
Caribbean^ 6.96 11.31 3.67 37.25 12.75 21.30 2.65 3.48 
EU 28^ 8.94 12.92 10.27 35.75 13.15 13.30 2.00 5.14 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, Series: Distribution of tertiary graduates by programmes, 
Year: from 1990 to 2012. Notes: ^ Regional average. (a) Data for Egypt, Libya and Syria not available. (b) The sum of the percentages may 
not add up to 100 percent. (c) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's classification, which 
include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (d) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) 
economies. (e) East Asia refers to China (no data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (f) Latin America & the Caribbean 
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Even in those countries with a high quality of mathematics and science education, students are more 
likely  to opt for humanities, arts and social sciences (HAS) in tertiary education in comparasion to 
students in developed economies, with an even smaller number of students pursuing science, 
engineering, and technical studies (SET).  The choice of subjects studied at tertiary education affects 
the ubiquitous use and development rates of advanced technologies. Although the region's average 
proportion of tertiary graduates in SET was comparable to that of developed East Asian and 
European economies, or even higher in some cases, the proportion of HAS graduates was not only 
higher than any other world region, but also approximately 23 percent higher than the proportion of 
SET graduates. The percentage difference between tertiary graduates of HAS and SET in the Southern 
Mediterranean countries is comparable to the one of the EU’s and Latin American averages, but it 
was significantly dissimilar to (South) East Asian averages, where the quality in mathematics and 
science education is among the highest worldwide. The proportion of SET and HAS graduates was 
most balanced in Tunisia, where the proportion of graduates from each of the cohorts accounted for 
slightly more than 40 percent of the total number of graduates; here, the proportion of SET 
graduates is among the highest in the Southern Mediterranean region. Although the proportion of 
SET graduates is comparable to the MENA region's average, Algeria has far more HAS graduates (64 
percent), and thus the most unbalanced graduate distribution in the MENA region, followed by 
Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine. 
Despite generous expenditure on education, most Southern Mediterranean economies show short-
comings in socio-economic policies, as well as an inability or lack of political will of to generate socio-
economic policies that promote structural reforms and respond to global demand and competition. 
Conclusion 
Unemployment and youth became became heavily discussed topics in the discourses surrounding 
the 2010-2011 social uprisings across the Southern Mediterranean region, particularly since youth 
unemployment shot to above 20 percent in the region after the uprisings. The common phenomena 
we observe across the Southern Mediterranean economies are their overall improvements in terms 
of overall unemployment, while (youth) unemployment numbers remain problematic. 
Youth represent 20 percent of the labour force in Southern Mediterranean, but 50 percent of the 
total unemployment, which signals the extent of the marglisation facing young people in the labour 
market. The magnitude of this marginalisation varies between the economies in the MENA region, 
distinguishing those Southern Mediterranean economies that were affected by social unrests and 
those who were not. There are several ways to measure this magnitude, and to interpret its link to 
the social unrests in the affected economies. In Tunisia, 46 percent of unemployed persons were 
youth. In Egypt, and Jordan to a lesser extent, despite a falling share of youth in the total 
unemployment rates, the number of unemployed young people actually increased. In Syria, only less 
than 1 percent of the total newly created jobs over the past decade are occupied by youth. One root 
cause of youth marginalisation is the demographic pressure in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
thanks to their youthful population. But with plummeting (youth) population growth rates, and a 
contraction of the youth labour force, one can also maintain that the effects could have been smaller 
than expected, if not marginal. This is by no means to discount the role of demographic dynamics in 
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unemployment problem. These subjects and factors interact and respond to policies with effects that 
are hard to measure or to quantify. 
Youth unemployment in Southern Mediterranean countries was actually more influenced by the 
effects of post-colonial policies that mirrored state- and capacity-building efforts and legitimacy 
consolidation, having long-term impacts on people’s attitudes. During the post-colonial period, many 
Southern Mediterranean states implemented free education up to higher education levels, with 
university graduates having guaranteed jobs in the public sector (Anderson, 1987 and Teixeira, 2009 
cited in Buckner, 2011, p. 21). This aspect of the post-colonial period has remained until today, as 
education in most of the Southern Mediterranean states is still is free up to the tertiary level; more 
and more people in the Southern Mediterranean region are literate and educated (Mahdi et al., 
2013: 2), and many see education as an opportunity for social mobility (Cohen, 2004 cited in 
Buckner, 2011: 21). In today's context, where young people are becoming increasingly educated, 
those aged between 15 and 24 are more likely to stay in education longer. This development partly 
explains the decreasing youth labour force participation rate in the MENA region. If these findings 
were verified, such developments could challenge the youth definitions used by international 
organisations in the context of labour markets.  
By the 1970s, the Southern Mediterranean governments found themselves racking up public budget 
deficits which eventually forced them to shift toward neoliberal reforms. Neoliberal reforms in the 
1970s and 1980s led to high economic growth, but the effects on unemployment rates were 
marginal. The reforms benefited the resource rich economies, as oil exports expanded globally during 
the oil booms. The capital intensive oil industry is linked to low employment elasticity, and the 
economic growth had limited influence on employment expansion. 
Southern Mediterranean economies lack a synergy between structural reforms and the 
transformation in the private sector. Governments were offering less public positions, but the private 
sector did not expand fast enough to absorb the affected persons. This reveals the state's lack of 
capacity to follow up with institutional reforms that truly promote liberalisation. Bureaucracy-
oriented education systems became out-dated, and produced graduates with skills that did not 
match the requirements in the private sector. The governments' attempts to mitigate the impact of 
the market liberalisation on the affected persons with more equitable social benefits produced a 
zero-sum effect on the budget, but shaped people's attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour. In 
response to employment erosion, some people in the labour force choose to remain in school and to 
obtain a higher education qualification in order to increase their employability. Others choose to stay 
out of the labour market, because they can afford to do so (middle-income households). As the job 
search period protracts, the enthusiasm of young and first-time job seekers will dampen further by 
the day. The so-called “hittistes” - young people literally leaning against the wall on the streets, 
watching the days go by without doing anythin, because they are jobless and hopeless - represent 
this phenomenon in the Southern Mediterranean countries.15 A negative growth in youth labour 
force due to lower youth participation in the labour market is not a real contraction; it is a 
procrastination of a social problem that is just waiting to erupt. 
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This attitude is also linked to the socio-economic equity focused policies of many Southern 
Mediterranean states through rent transfers and distributions in the form of social benefits to 
contain the spread of discontent caused by the dismal job market. Many Southern Mediterranean 
states do not have comprehensive social security programmes, but their public social security 
expenditure (in percentages of the GDP) is higher than most middle-income economies, implying 
that social benefits in the region are likely to be more generous.16 Generous social benefits become a 
source of moral hazard among unemployed persons when they start to depend on pay-outs to 
survive, and at the same time they deter from productive economic participation, cultivating a 
culture of “waiting” until they land on a government job. This development is also a by-product of 
the Southern Mediterranean states' earlier policies during the post-colonial period when the public 
sector expanded and not only provided higher wages, but also more social security compared to the 
private sector. Despite contraction in the public labour sector over the past three decades of 
neoliberal reforms, these expectations have not disappeared. Instead, job seekers are willing to wait 
until they get a job in the public sector. A survey conducted by Silatech, in collaboration with Gallup 
Inc., shows that more than 50 percent of the youth interviewed (aged between 15 and 29) still 
expressed preference to work for the government, despite their grim opinion of the job market 
(except in Libya).17 
In the Southern Mediterranean, the youth expectation that better job prospects can be reached 
through eduction are fruitless. Highly educated youth are finding themselves under attack from all 
fronts for being young and highly educated. Those who fall through the crack resort to informal jobs, 
where working conditions are often sub-standard, and the workers' social welfare is unprotected, or 
they decide to emigrate. Either way, for the state, this means a loss of taxes that could otherwise be 
added to public expenditure. On the other hand, the governments' inability to reform and transform 
their economies is not a question of political will alone. External competition has weakened the 
Southern Mediterranean domestic economic capacities to the extent that they are not benefiting 
much from globalisation, neither individually nor as an economy. Last but not least, Southern 
Mediterranean economies lack the regional integration and cooperation required to develop a 
supply-chain network, to support their market liberalisation programmes, and to proceed to real 
economic transformation. 
                                                            
16 See table A.2 in the Appendix. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 Scores (Eighth Grade) 
 
 Mathematics Science 
Algeria^ 387 408 
Egypt^ 405 417 
Israel* 516 516 
Jordan* 406 449 
Lebanon* 449 406 
Morocco* 371 376 
Syria* 380 426 
Tunisia* 425 439 
Palestine* 404  
Southern Mediterranean**^^ 422 435 
Southeast Asia** 466 468 
East Asia** 595 554 
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Global** 467 478 
 
Source: Author's own elaboration and calculations, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 Scores, last accessed 28 
January 2014 at http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/data-release-2011/pdf/Overview-TIMSS-and-PIRLS-2011-Achievement.pdf, Salehi-Isfahani et 
al. (2011) as illustrated in Salehi-Isfahani (2012), pp. 855. Notes: * Scores from Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 
Scores. ^ 2007 scores from Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2011) as illustrated in Salehi-Isfahani (2012), pp. 855. ** Average. ^^ Includes Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia and Palestine. (a) Data for Libya not available. (b) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast 
Asia Nations (ASEAN) economies. Southeast Asia average scores excluding Singapore were 418 for mathematics and science 428. (d) East 
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Table A.2. Public social security expenditure (percentage of the GDP) 
 
 2010 Latest data available 
Egypt 8.96 14.07 
Israel 17.21 16.54 
Jordan 12.53 12.56 
Lebanon  5.28 
Morocco 4.43  
Syria 3.22  
Tunisia 8.73 9.82 
Southern Mediterranean* 9.18 11.65 
Middle East & North Africa* 8.35 11.04 
ASEAN* 2.35 3.16 
East Asia* 8.34 10.18 
Latin America & the Caribbean* 7.91 7.58 
 
Source: International Labor Organization's World Social Security Report, 2010-2011, Table 25. Note: * Regional average. (a) Data for 
Algeria, Libya and Palestine not available. (b) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's 
classification, which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia 
Nations (ASE8AN) economies. (d) East Asia refers to China, Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (e) Latin America & the Caribbean 
refers to the 41 economies according The World Bank's classification. 
  
